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Abstract—Cloud computing is an important step in our era, delivering many advantages in business and our daily life. However, 
as every new technology, various challenges are brought into light with one of them being the misuse of Cloud computing 
environments for criminal activities. As such, Cloud service providers have to establish adequate forensic capabilities in order to 
support forensics investigations in the event of illegal activities in the cloud. In order to help forensics investigations, this paper 
deals with log format unification in cloud platforms using Distributed Management Task Force’s (DMTF) Cloud Auditing Data 
Federation (CADF) standard. CADF event logging is utilised in the widely used OpenStack, and we have modified the Apache 
CloudStack platform to become forensically sound. Furthermore, we conducted investigation of the existing CloudStack platform 
along with the proposed CADF event model implemented, with regards to the principles of the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) on handling digital evidence. The results are provided in this paper as well as an automated parsing tool/CADF event 
consumer, named C.Lo.D, which is freely available and can be downloaded from Github. 
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1 INTRODUCTION
HE uprising needs to reduce service costs, the 
integration of services between non-portable and 
portable devices and the ever-increasing demands on 
storage and computing power have led companies to cloud 
computing systems. The volume of the processing 
procedure is transferred to the cloud, making it imperative 
to define processes of forensic analysis but also to solve the 
open challenges/limitations of forensics in this new 
environment. As Dykstra [1] noted, crime heads to where 
people, data and money are gathered. 
In the era of Big Data, Virtualization and Cloud 
Computing, the volume of information stored are 
disproportionately large concerning the speed of transfer. 
The process of acquisition during the investigation for 
digital evidence is the most decisive for its course since it 
will provide the investigator with the subject on which 
he/she will perform the forensic analysis. Limitations set by 
the volume of data are time, cost, and validity. 
Cybercrime and Internet cannot be seen in isolation 
from one another. More specifically, the Internet, 
depending on how it is used by malicious users, divides 
cybercrime into 1) cyber-assisted, 2) cyber-enabled, 3) 
cyber-dependent.  
Cybercriminals enjoy the same benefits of cloud usage 
with businesses. Increased computing power, increased 
capacity, energy and cost savings, anonymity and elasticity 
are just some of the features that malicious users can take 
advantage of, thus expanding their capabilities and goals. 
The creation and use of botnets, data-mining, crypto-
mining and Command-n-Control (CnC) centres are now 
easier than ever. However, apart from the tools of criminals, 
the range of targets is also significantly increased. Once a 
customer decides to use the cloud services, he/she has to 
accept that his/her data are no longer available only for 
him/her or in a particular location. When the Internet of 
Things (IoT)/Internet of Anything (IoA) factor is added to 
the above equation, where each device can connect and 
communicate with a network – often using the cloud 
infrastructure – then, the targets (in number) and the 
complexity of attacks skyrocket [2]. 
A significant motivation for cloud usage in cybercrime is 
also the lack of tools and procedures of forensic analysis 
combined with open issues [3], [4]. Many times, criminals 
do not even need anti-forensics, as long as they use any 
infrastructure outside the judicial and administrative 
jurisdiction of the authorities as a basis for any malicious 
energy. 
A system’s log files are a critical component for 
debugging and monitoring its operation and current 
status. During a forensic investigation, these files may 
contain important information related to the investigated 
incident. They are one of the key "witnesses" of what was 
happening to a system at a specific time. 
It is generally accepted that the process of e-discovery, 
collection and analysis of digital evidence in cloud 
environments differs from that in-home/corporate 
computing systems as it is a cross-discipline of cloud 
computing and digital forensics [5]. The difference lies in 
the absence of tools, procedures but mainly in the case of 
the possible geographical dispersion of the system under 
investigation. Non-physical access to a system requires 
specific, technical and legal, conditions of remote access to 
be provided. At this point, questions are raised about 
ensuring the integrity of data. 
In cloud environments where the amount of information 
of log files is enormous, useful information may not be 
easily located. Moreover, cloud-related issues such as 
fragmentation, geographical dispersion and different 
implementations make it difficult to identify useful 
information. 
This paper investigates how the Cloud Auditing Data 
Federation (CADF) event model could be implemented in 





improved, and what test case scenarios could be 
considered. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II 
provides a literature review of recent studies on auditing 
and cloud forensics, Section III studies CloudStack’s current 
event model and Section IV proposes DMTF’s CADF event 
model. Section V presents the implementation, testing and 
validation of CADF for CloudStack. In Section VI discussion 
raises issues and suggestions regarding implementation 
and Section VII is examining CADF’s compliance to ACPO 
principles. Section VIII presents a CADF log parsing tool. 
Finally, in Section IX, conclusions of this paper are 
presented, and in Section X, future directions are outlined. 
2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Related work 
The issue of cloud log format unification was identified by 
Simou as part of the examination stage [6] while the first 
official and comprehensive attempt to collect all open 
issues in cloud forensics was held on behalf of NIST in 2014 
[3]. A new study, in 2015, highlighted the reliance on the 
availability and type of log files on the Cloud service 
provider [7]. In particular, in Software as a Service (SaaS) 
and Platform as a Service (PaaS) models, it is the sole 
responsibility of the provider to make log files available 
without giving any assurance about the integrity of the 
deliverables and whether they can be accepted by the 
judicial authorities or not. 
In 2011, while studying the Eucalyptus cloud platform, 
the interaction of its components was recorded in logs. This 
detected a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack that 
started through the cloud being examined [8]. The same 
year, Birk and Wegener were the first to suggest the use of 
a read-only API to enable cloud customer to download data 
from it and offer them to the investigators [9]. 
According to [10][11], due to the heterogeneous nature 
of cloud log files, at least 1) When the event is logged, 2) 
What is logged precisely, 3) Which is the format of logging, 
should be specified. Timestamp, Application, User, Session 
id, Severity, Reason and Categorization are defined as 
minimum components of logging following the “key-value” 
format.  
In research regarding ACPO guidelines and Cloud 
Forensics [12], the impact and issues during a digital 
investigation on the cloud while trying to apply the four 
principles were presented. Methodology differs 
accordingly to the deployment model (private, public, 
hybrid, community). In a private cloud, data stores are 
accessible and in known locations – by authorized 
personnel. The organization’s staff can also be familiar with 
the auditing procedure. On the other hand, public clouds 
are owned and managed by a Cloud Service Provider (CSP) 
in a way that clients have no clue about the underlying 
infrastructure. 
As it has been already pointed out [13], in Infrastructure 
as a Service (IaaS) model, the client is responsible for the 
 
 
1 http://uw714doc.sco.com/en/UDI_spec/m_mgmt.html  
investigations – except for exceptional cases. This paper 
disagrees with this point. A CSP must actively assist and be 
part of the investigative process. CSP will be benefited in 
general more than the client if the investigation is 
successful and the case is closed. In case of an incident, it 
is likely that a vulnerability on the CSP’s platform was 
exploited and sensitive data may have breached out. Often, 
the consequences of such cases can harm the corporate 
reputation and business activity of the CSP. 
A different approach was attempted in 2015, suggesting 
the Open Cloud Forensics (OCF) model [11]. There are four 
entities in the OCF model - user, CSP, investigator and 
judicial authorities. Based on this, every access to the cloud 
produces Electronically Stored Information (ESI), a thing 
that is not acceptable to the legal authorities. In order to 
be accepted, the CSP must follow a specific procedure to 
render it valid to the judicial authorities. This process is 
continuous (Continuous Forensics Process). Although it 
does not explicitly refer to log files, the core idea includes 
them, as long as they belong to data that the CSP must 
validate. 
Pătraşcu and Valeriu Patriciu presented in 2015 a 
forensics framework that can be integrated into existing 
cloud infrastructures as well as into new ones. After 
comparing two forms of representing the event data, 
“Management Metalanguage” by UnixWare1 and Common 
Event Expression (CEE) Language2, they agreed on a 
combination of both. In this way, they leveraged the 
functionality of Management Language with the help of 
JSON data visualization [14]. Then, they divided the cloud 
architecture into Management and Virtualization. At the 
management level, they added a Cloud Forensics Module 
that assumes to log data from the interaction of the cloud 
components. At the level of virtualization, they suggested 
using Cloud Forensics Interface to collect data from the 
virtual machines internal. This suggestion - at least in terms 
of management - reminds strongly of the logic of a 
telemetry component. Their idea was applied only to KVM 
hypervisors. Data that can be collected are well above the 
log files since it is possible to download virtual disks and 
memory dumps. 
In 2015, DMTF defined the seven essential questions 
that need to be answered in order to fully describe an 
event, known as the 7W’s of audit [15] (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
7W's of Audit 
W Description 
What What was the action and what was its 
result 
When When did the event take place 
Who Who triggered the event 
From Where From where was the event triggered 
On What What was the target of the action 
Where Who observed and reported the event 
To Where Where is the target located 
 
2 http://cee.mitre.org/language/1.0-beta1/cls.html  
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Kumar Raju and Geethakumari studied in 2016, the 
possibility of correlating information contained in log files 
from the perspective of the forensic investigator on the 
OpenStack platform [16]. A normalization process was 
applied to log files in order to resolve the problem of 
common and single format temporarily. Correlation of 
information was made on log files either from 
homogeneous artefacts or heterogeneous. 
Sekhar and Murali again raised the issue of trust in the 
CSP by applying a Secure Logging Services system. Based 
on the homomorphic encryption of log file records, they 
protect them against any possible alteration [17]. This can 
come either from the CSP or from an attacker who has 
gained access to the CSP and the cloud internals. 
The same year, a study proposed a safe logging 
approach based on data collection and display by 
combining three algorithms [18]: 
1. SystemInit – performed on CSP and produced the 
necessary components for encryption.  
2. KeyGen - performed by the user and produces a 
type of digital signature.  
3. SecLogging - It combines the results of the above 
two algorithms and encrypts log blocks instead of 
log entries. 
In 2017, the need to establish a single mechanism for 
collecting log files was identified since existing solutions 
either do not cover the different cloud models (IaaS, PaaS, 
SaaS) or do not overcome the obstacles of locating, 
reviewing and correlating information in them [19]. The 
most comprehensive solution was the CADF approach, but 
two issues emerged. The first issue was related to the 
absence of use cases and tests to demonstrate whether 
data collected on the basis of CADF are enough to conduct 
an investigation or not. The second one was the existence 
of too much data in the log files, a fact that makes research 
difficult. 
The problem of integrating log files has re-emerged in 
the case study of 3 different storage service providers 
(Cloud Storage Service Provider), that is Amazon Web 
Services Simple Storage Service (AWSS3), Google Cloud 
Platform Storage and Microsoft Azure Storage [20]. The 
solution suggested is the use of a single format/structure 
in the log files. This occurs as a result of the following three 
steps: 1) Collection of log files from different providers, 2) 
Check for duplicates in the log files, 3) Conversion and 
normalization to the desired format. The logic followed 
refers to the one developed by CADF standard. 
In 2018, a paper was presented on the detailed 
examination of cloud logging mechanisms to facilitate 
forensic investigation [21]. At the same time, CADF 
standard was implemented for CloudStack system. 
Penetration tests were then performed to verify the proper 
operation of this application, but only a Replay Attack type 
was able to be captured. The reason for this is that the 
implementation was only obtaining the API calls instead of 
examining each event explicitly. 
 
 
3 http://www.sendmail.org/  
The need for event logging is imperative for all sorts of 
projects, be it simple scripts of a few tens of lines of code 
or large-scale projects. However, the most important issue 
is What will be logged, How it will be presented, in Which 
format, Where and in How it will be stored. Various log file 
formats have been suggested and used by organizations 
and companies from time to time. Gagliardi Rocco, in his 
article on a corporate blog, lists some of the most crucial 
Logging formats [22]. 
It is indicative that from 2003 and onwards CIM and 





Format Type Proposed by Year Status 
CBE Proprietary IBM, Cisco 2003 Dead 
CIM Open DMTF 2005 Alive 
CEF Proprietary ArcSight 2006 Alive 
CEE Open MITRE 2007 Dead 
OLF Proprietary elQNetworks 2007 Dead 
WELF Proprietary WebTrends 2008 Alive 
LEEF Proprietary Q1 Labs 2013 Alive 
CADF Open DMTF 2015 Alive 
 
Both are DMTF's work, but there are no other similarities. 
CIM is a standard for describing software and hardware 
features in a single way for different manufacturers. 
Different manufacturer products can be described using 
common fields such as device name, serial number, model 
etc. [23]. CADF is thoroughly studied at a later stage of this 
paper. 
Until now (2019), the most widely accepted logging 
standard is syslog, as described in RFC 5424. It is 
implemented with minor variations from various operating 
systems. Although it was developed in 1983 as part of the 
“sendmail” project3, it was officially established as a 
standard in March 2009 [24]. The majority of tasks 
performed by modern operating systems and their 
applications, use syslog format in log files. The main fields 
of the syslog message are the facility code, severity level, 
process ID, timestamp, hostname and IP address of the 
resource logging the event. 
2.2 Cloud auditing and forensics 
Cloud Auditing is a continuous process designed to 
measure and provides CSPs with data on the performance 
and compliance with the safety requirements of their 
services. These are metrics and statistics that enable CSPs 
to monitor and continually improve their service and safety 
level. Cloud Auditing is usually conducted by a third entity 
if there is no dedicated team or department within the 
organization. Auditor undertakes to complete the process 
in stages, depending on the entity's strategy, the provider's 
checking over the safety of communications, system 
management and upgrades, data management, risk 




However, it is important to note the fact that many times in 
favour of the provider’s Management, auditing focuses on 
the performance of system services rather than on the 
accurate presentation of what exactly is happening in 
systems at a technical level. Auditing should include 
management, technical staff and infrastructures [25]. It 
needs to be extended at all levels (from Hardware, Host OS 
and Virtualization Software, etc.) as well as in all 
development models (private, community, public and 
hybrid). Customers of cloud providers take access to 
auditing and monitoring data for granted. Customers will 
trust providers with their corporate and personal data and 
therefore, they require specific safeguards. Cloud Auditing 
is about audit procedures that can be expanded vertically 
in the organizational chart of an organization as well as 
across its entire infrastructure. However, it is imperative in 
particular for each department concerned to use a 
common language and toolbox. Actually, as Konoor points 
out [26], any operation in the infrastructure must be 
performed in such a way that it provides relevant 
information for future analysis and review. 
Underlying cloud architecture is not friendly to forensics. 
Detection and analysis of any event require the use of quick 
tools but primarily of tools able to limit the scope of the 
investigation. Cloud forensics tools have to face multiple 
challenges [3]. When it comes to log files, in particular, 
there is a difficulty in terms of the criteria according to 
which it will be determined which logs are useful and which 
can be used. Furthermore, there is no specific standard for 
WHAT will be logged by the CSP. Regardless of the service 
model (IaaS, PaaS, SaaS) data that are valuable to the 
investigator of a cloud incident are not on the customer’s 
side. On customer’s side only temporary files, cookies and 
session information files can be found. These do not 
provide enough information to associate an activity with 
more than 3 out of 7 Ws. We see that analysis on the CSP’s 
side is the only way. Taking the trust to the provider’s entity 
for granted, a tool and therefore, the investigator himself, 
should be able to ask the provider for specific data based 
on criteria. Receiving them requires a secure 
communication channel, and their processing requires 
respecting the privacy of other users. The answer to the 
issues above is called Web API and API Endpoints. The 
provision of these interfaces is now available by default on 
every cloud platform. In a forensic investigation, it is 
necessary to minimize CSP’s involvement. In practice, it 
depends on the cloud deployment model, the owner of the 
hardware infrastructure and the type of cloud platforms 
(proprietary or open-source). However, the use of open 
standards, such as the CADF, may minimize the CSP’s 
possibilities to interfere in the log files. 
Naaz and Ahmad studied the possibilities and 
limitations of FROST and UFED Cloud Analyzer tools [27], 
whereas a study of researchers was published the same 
year describing the experiences and difficulties 
encountered in developing three cloud forensics tools for 
 
 
4 https://toolcatalog.nist.gov/  
the SaaS model[28]. These tools are kumodd, kumodocs 
and kumofs. 
Simou pointed that due to the lack of cloud forensics 
tools, investigators use existing software solutions [4]. They 
either examine acquired files with them, considering as 
reliable by default, or they try to perform a remote analysis. 
However, the tools that enable remote analysis have not 
been tested and certified regarding the appropriateness 
and preservation of data integrity and thus do not provide 
any assurance that they will be accepted by the judicial 
authorities. 
Finally, there are also custom cloud-based solutions 
applied by organizations for inside use. Netflix is one such 
case [29]. These solutions are proprietary and are not 
available to the general public, or they are commercial 
products, or at best they fall into Free and Open Source 
(FOSS) category. 
The NIST Institute applies a process for the assessment 
of forensics tools. This assessment includes a series of tests 
called Computer Forensic Tool Testing (CFTT) and produces 
results in the form of reports (CFTT Reports). This creates a 
list of NIST-approved tools4 for disk imaging, file carving, 
email parsing, etc. Approval of tools plays a significant role 
in the acceptance of the tool’s results by the judicial 
authorities. Investigators clearly prefer the use of tools 
approved by NIST. However, the search in cloud forensics 
tools list illuminates the scarcity in this field. Only six tools 
are related to cloud forensics: 
1. Belkasoft Evidence Center 
2. Elcomsoft Cloud Explorer 
3. Elcomsoft Phone Breaker 
4. Internet Evidence Finder 
5. Magnet AXIOM 
6. UFED Cloud Analyzer 
3 CURRENT MODEL 
At a structural level, CloudStack consists of a number of 
subprojects. CloudStack events are divided into three 
categories, 1) Action events, 2) Usage events, 3) Alerts. They 
are also divided into 1) Standard events, 2) Long running 
job events. Finally, events are categorized as 1) 
Synchronous events, 2) Asynchronous/Scheduled events. 
Inside the API subproject, 352 different Action events are 
defined. 
Event logging in CloudStack is performed on the cloud-
server package, which is the core of the management 
server. The following operations take place (see Error! 
Reference source not found.): 
1. The API call is redirected as a web request. 
2. Checks are performed on the request. 
3. API call’s key parameters are stored. 
4. The request is forwarded to the corresponding 
entity. 
5. Entity executes the action and creates a response 
with the results. 
6. Event is logged 





Fig. 1. CloudStack current event logging model 
 
The built-in class that is responsible for describing the 
events in CloudStack is EventVO. Fields named type, state, 
description, createDate and userId provide essential 
information that can be used in forensic investigation. Field 
“type” contains a string representing the resource that 
relates to action along with the response. Field 
“description” is a string and information merger, different 
for each event, so it does not have a specific structure in 
order to be parsed by automated tools. 
 
Table 3 
7W's and EventVO 
Question CloudStack EventVO fields 
What Description 
When createDate 
Who uuid, userId  
FromWhere no information available 
OnWhat      Description 
Where no information available 
ToWhere no information available 
 
According to Table 3, it is clear that no information is 
stored in the event concerning the geographical location, 
e-mail address, exact resource’s physical and logical 
address, platform and system information that triggered 
the event. 
4 PROPOSED MODEL 
DMTF’s CADF event model [30] is a model to represent 
events related to the cloud. In a cloud infrastructure, all the 
resources interact with each other and exchange data. This 
exchange must comply with specific rules and regulations. 
CADF explicitly defines the term event. CADF classifies 
events based on the type of event, regardless of the cloud 
component, cloud application or deployment model. Valid 
event types are 1) monitor, 2) activity, 3) control. Monitor 
events provide information about the status or attributes 
of a resource. Activity events are events initiated by a 
resource against another resource. Control events contain 
information about the application of a policy. Depending 
on the type of event, some fields differ, but the core 
components for each event are standard (see Table 4). 
CADF collects data (see Table 5) from various cloud layers 
without exposing though any information or technical 
details about the underlying infrastructure. Observer 




Required CADF Components 
Component Description 
OBSERVER The Resource that generates the 
event record based on its observation 
of the actual event 
INITIATOR The Resource that initiated the 
event’s Action 
ACTION The operation or activity the Initiator 
attempted to or performed against 
Target 
TARGET The Resource against which Action 
was performed 




CADF Event Fields 
Field Description 
typeURI Definition of the event model’s 
version and name 
Id Event’s id 
eventType Type of Event 
eventTime The timestamp of the event as 
noted by the OBSERVER 
Action The action performed against 
TARGET 
Outcome The outcome of ACTION 
Initiator The resource that performed the 
Action 
Initiatorid INITIATOR’s id 
Target The resource against who action 
was performed 
Targetid TARGET ‘s id 
Observer Resource monitoring other 
resources and logging events 
Observerid OBSERVER’s id 
Measurements Measurements and statistics 
regarding the Event 
Reason More information about the 
OUTCOME 
Name The descriptive name for the event 
Severity The severity of the Event – used only 
by OBSERVER 
Duration ACTION’s duration 
Tags Tags for storing extra information 




Reporterchain Information on the reporting chain 
of the event 
 
 Resource entity is classified into taxonomies [30] 
(Storage, Compute, Network, Data, Service, System, 
Unknown). Top-level taxonomies are also divided into 
secondary categories. Action and Outcome entities are also 
classified into Taxonomies. 
CADF’s goal is to provide all the resource-related 
information to investigators and system auditors in order 
to assist in tracking certain activities. It is described as the 
Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) for Clouds [31]. In 
particular, the model is designed to have the ability to 
answer all the 7 W’s of forensics [15], [32] (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6 
7W's and CADF 
W CADF component 
What EventType, ACTION, 
OUTCOME 
When REPORTER 
Who    INITIATOR 
FromWhere    INITIATOR 
On What    TARGET 
Where    OBSERVER 
To Where TARGET 
 
5 IMPLEMENTATION 
Three top-level classes were created during the 
implementation of the CADF Event model, 1) Cadf, 2) 
Resource, 3) Taxonomy. The CADF mechanism is 
implemented in the subproject cloud-server, as part of the 
management server (see Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 2. CloudStack proposed event logging model 
 
Cadf class provides properties and methods for 
describing a CADF event based on the CloudStack 
event(EventVO). Cadf class fields typeURI, eventType, 
action, outcome, eventTime, measurement, reason, 
observer, initiator and target are defined. Class structure is 
similar to CADF model (see Table 4) so that serialization can 
be performed on each object in JSON format and be 
logged in a file. Key operations are applied to match 
CloudStack entities to CADF compliant model. 
We tampered ActionEventUtils class, where generic 
CloudStack events are captured and performed the 
following operation in order to implement our mechanism 
without modifying the existing one: 
1. When a generic CloudStack event occurs 
(ActionEventUtils class), a method is called 
(createCadfRecord()) with an EventVO object as 
argument. This method creates a Cadf object and 
stores it to a logger object 
2. Cadf object is created by using as an argument in 
its constructor the generic CloudStack event 
object in order to extract all the information 
without making any changes to the actual event 
source code. Every object is a single event. 
3. A check on the Cadf's mandatory fields is 
performed based on eventType field 
4. Cadf object is converted into JSON representation 
with Google's Gson library 
(https://github.com/google/gson) 
5. JSON representation of the object is logged 
Inside Cadf's constructor, we collect all the necessary 
information and match all CloudStack and CADF entities 
accordingly: 
1. Cadf class constructor's parameter is the generic 
CloudStack event object (EventVO). The class field 
typeURI is set in order to declare this event as a   
event. 
2. CADF’s Action and Target are extracted from 
EventVO.type property (see Table 7). A function 
(setCADFAction()) performs pattern matching 
against hashmaps to match the CloudStack event 
action with a corresponding CADF Action. Cadf 
class field action is set. The hashmap table is 
implemented in Taxonomy class.  
3. A function (getCADFResourceName()) matches 
the extracted target property against a hashmap 
(Taxonomy class) with CADF standard resource 
names. Target Resource object is created 
(Resource class) based on this matching. 
4. Cadf class field eventType is set based on the 
action class field. This is important, as for different 
types of events (eventType field) the mandatory 
fields of the record also differ. 
5. A function (mapEventStateToCADFTaxonomy()) 
sets the Cadf class field’s outcome value based on 
a matching between generic CloudStack's event 
state property (Taxonomy class) 
6. Cadf class field eventTime is set on a UTC format 
7. Cadf class field Initiator is created (Resource class) 
8. Cadf class field Observer is created (Resource 
class) 
9. Additional information related to the event is 
collected – currently the initiator host, user agent, 
userid, and account name are gathered, but these 
can be extended in a future work 
 




Target and Action Extraction from EventVO.type 
EventVO.type Target Resource Action 





CADF has been created to cover any kind of event for 
any platform. Some platforms use a specific resource for 
monitoring and another for management, but CloudStack 
does not offer this option. Furthermore, this 
implementation refers only to events that resulted from a 
user action. For this reason, there is a manual assignment 
to Initiator. Some additional information is being collected 
on the Management Server through a list of values added 
to CADF as custom fields, such as initiator_userid and 
initiator_csAccountName which particularly refer to 
CloudStack. Other fields are the Initiator’s IP address, user-
agent, platform etc. 
Resource class implements properties and functionality 
of the resource. A resource is used to represent entities of 
a CADF event. Initiator, Observer and Target are Resource 
objects. In order to describe a Resource, there are 
mandatory properties such as typeURI, id, name, domain, 
credential, addresses, host, geolocation, attachments. 
Entities depending on the Resource, such as Host, are 
defined as subclasses. 
Taxonomy class is auxiliary. It contains the enumerations 
of various fields of the CADF and Resource classes, such as 
eventType, Action and Outcome. It also contains the string 
constants about the taxonomy-related Reason fields as well 
the string constants for each type of resource supported by 
CADF. However, the most important operation of 
Taxonomy class is the creation of matching lists among 
entities of CloudStack and CADF. Matching CloudStack’s 
resources and actions with corresponding CADF-compliant 
entities requires an understanding of each CloudStack 
event (352 total events). Events that could not be matched 
were defined as “unknown”. In Taxonomy class 3 hashmap 
structures were created in order to match related entities 
1. CstoCadfResourceMapping for Resource matching 
2. EventActionToTypeMapping for Action matching 
3. EventResourcetoUuidMapping for unique UUID 
assignment 
Additionally, some property files were configured 
(build/replace.properties and client/conf/log4j-
cloud.xml.in) so that our mechanism logs event records in 
a separate file. 
Apache CloudStack 4.11 was forked from the original 
project to a branch named “cadf_events”. This 
implementation is available for download and testing5. 
5.1 Testing 
Testing the functionality of the CADF model was performed 
in 3 ways: 
1. CloudStack’s web interface 
 
 
5 https://github.com/ndalezios/cloudstack/tree/cadf_events  
6 https://github.com/apache/cloudstack-cloudmonkey  
7 https://github.com/apache/cloudstack/pull/3232  
2. CloudMonkey CLI6 
3. DevCloud 4 testing environment and marvin 
scripts (deployDataCenter.py) 
After committing this implementation, a pull request was 
placed in CloudStack’s main repository with ID #3232. Pull 
request status7. A tool presented in Section 8 makes use of 
testing’s output file containing all the events produced 
during the testing phase. The dataset is also available8. 
5.2 Validation 
All the changes made do not affect CloudStack's 
functionality. All the existing tests (mvn tests while 
constructed) were successfully passed along with the 
automated validation checks that are performed after a pull 
request. Some Cloudstack committers reviewed our 
proposal and commented suggestions for minor 
organizational issues which were addressed and fixed. 
Additional changes were made, and this pull request is now 
marked with GitHub labels “component:logging”, 
“type:enhancement” and “type:improvement”. In June 
2019, a review was requested from the rest of the 
committers, which is still pending. 
All the CADF event records that were logged during our 
tests were stored on a dataset following the JSON CADF 
format and is available for download8 along with a dataset9 
which it contains CADF records from OpenStack’ utilization 
for further research.  
6 DISCUSSION 
6.1 Functionality 
Upon completion of the implementation, the 7 Ws can be 
answered by CADF as opposed to the default CloudStack 
model. Comparison of Table 3 and  
Table 6 demonstrates the superiority of the suggested 
model against the existing one. The functionality of the 
CADF model can be divided into simple and advanced. 
Simple is limited to filling only mandatory fields for each 
type of event, while advanced includes as many fields as 
possible. However, both in the OpenStack project and the 
Apache CloudStack, CADF was not the event mapping 
model for which the platform was designed. This leads to 
an arbitrary decision whether changes need to be made 
within each event to provide through source code the 
necessary information to fill in the CADF fields, or whether 
matching of fields and values should - by losing precision - 
be made at a central point.  
The most appropriate decision is to combine the above 
approaches and to understand and change each event 
separately. However, the process has some drawbacks. It is 
time-consuming since it concerns 352 different events. It is 
complicated because each event according to its type 
contains various information and has a severe difficulty in 
terms of integration and merging with the original project, 
as for each event a change must be made to at least 1 
CloudStack file. 
8 https://github.com/ndalezios/clod/blob/master/cs_events  




6.2 Suggestions and improvements 
In order for CloudStack’s Action Events to comply with with 
the CADF standard, it is necessary to match each one of 
them with the corresponding CADF event. CADF’s Action 
Taxonomy includes 26 different actions. Matching is a 
significant problem because events in CloudStack are 
described verbally in the form of strings, by merging the 
target resource with the action. CloudStack’s events do not 
follow a specific standard. Events are characterized by the 
event_type field in terms of resource and action. In contrast, 
CADF provides an eventType field whose values determine 
if it is a monitor, control or action event. Table 8 illustrates 
some indicative cases. 
 
Table 8 
Cases of Event Naming Pattern Issues 
CloudStack Event Note 
VM.DESTROY Action “DESTROY” does not exist in 
CADF’s Action Taxonomy 




Action “DIAGNOSTICS” does not 
exist in CADF’s Action Taxonomy. If it 
existed, it should be named 
“DIAGNOSE”. The correct naming 
should be 
PROXY.DIAGNOSTICS.START  
NET.RULEADD Action RULEADD does not exist in 
CADF’s Action Taxonomy and should 




The action does not follow any 
naming pattern (use of “_”) and 
therefore cannot be ported to CADF 
CloudStack Event Note 
VM.DESTROY Action “DESTROY” does not exist in 
CADF’s Action Taxonomy 
 
Following the aforementioned events cases, as defined 
in CloudStack, there is a need to use a single event type 
format exclusively for CloudStack, which could be 
generalized across other platforms. The suggested format 
is a RESOURCE. (SUB-RESOURCE). (SUB-RESOURCE). 
ACTION. Where, in uppercase Latin characters, RESOURCE 
and SUB-RESOURCES (if any) are nouns, and ACTION is a 
verb (noun. (noun). (noun).verb). By following this format, 
even if there is no mapping for the Resource or Action in 
the CADF’s taxonomies, it is easy to create an events’ map. 
Fig. 3 illustrates the comments inside source code with our 
naming suggestions 
 
Fig. 3. Excerpt from EventTypes.java with naming 
suggestions as comments 
 
When a CloudStack user deletes one or more events 
from the database, apart from the deletion, no other action 
is taking place. There is no information on who removed 
what, when, from where etc. Events’ removal should trigger 
an EVENTS.DELETE event. In fact, only upon the first 
installation of CloudStack, event storage should be empty. 
We also implemented this functionality as an improvement 
of the existing logging mechanism. Any action to delete 
event records must be considered as an event itself. Only in 
this way, a malicious deletion of a history of actions from 
CloudStack can be identified. 
7 ACPO PRINCIPLES AND CADF 
As mentioned in [33], four principles related to the 
practices of handling and maintaining digital evidence have 
to be respected. Lallie and Pimlott [12] studied the 
application of the above principles to investigations in 
public clouds and highlighted a series of issues for each 
one of them. The CADF event model provides the 
opportunity to solve some of these issues. 
Regarding the 1st principle, they detect a time gap 
between the incident and the beginning of the 
investigation, where there is no control over the data. 
However, the auditing and the proposed CADF event 
logging solution can solve this issue by enabling the 
investigator to collect log files from a time point A (before 
the incident being investigated) up to a time point B (at the 
time of the beginning of the investigation). In this way, 
although there is no data protection against alterations, 
there is a log entry of these alterations (if any). 
Regarding the 2nd principle, since it is only about log 
files, there is read-only access permitted. Besides, 
“Acquisition” is a formal and defined process in common 
(not cloud) systems. Therefore, the required level of 
competency is not increased. In fact, the acquisition of log 
files can be carried out by the CSP itself – depending on 
the deployment model. However, if any change occurs in 
log files, this change should be considered as an event and 
should be logged. In particular, the process of deleting 
logged events does not constitute an event and is not 
registered in the CloudStack platform. We suggested and 
implemented creating an event record for this particular 
action. 
According to the 3rd principle, provisioning of an audit 
trail for each action on the digital evidence should be 
provided. A third investigating entity should have the same 
results by performing the same actions. Due to the absence 
of a unified form of log files, the investigator often resorts 
to custom solutions depending on the platform 
investigated (OpenStack, CloudStack, AWS, MS Azure). The 
process of repeating actions to achieve the same result 
involves also developing this custom solution. The answer 
to this comes with the introduction of a specific logging 
template and the creation of standardized tools - either 
open source (where it is easier to check if they affect the 
integrity of evidence) or commercial solutions. A tool for all 
platforms can pass the necessary checks to be certified by 
NIST. 
//TODO change value to VM.PASSWORD.RESET 
public  static  final  String EVENT_VM_RESETPASSWORD = "VM.RESETPASSWORD";  
//TODO change value to VM.SSHKEY.RESET  
public  static  final  String EVENT_VM_RESETSSHKEY = "VM.RESETSSHKEY";  
//TODO change value to ROUTER.DIAGNOSTICS.START  
public  static  final  String EVENT_ROUTER_DIAGNOSTICS = "ROUTER.DIAGNOSTICS";  
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8 CADF CONSUMERS 
The use of an event logging standard exempts developers 
from the need to study and configure the event analysis 
tools according to the platform that produced the log files. 
Therefore, they focus exclusively on the standard and the 
interpretation of its fields. One such attempt is the C.Lo.D 
tool (CADF Log Detective), available under Apache 2.0 
license in a public repository at GitHub10. Clod’s input is a 
log file containing log records in the form of CADF as JSON. 
Each line in the file usually includes information about the 
platform before and after the record (platform-specific 
information – see Fig. 4). 
 
Fig. 4. Event log line format 
 
Clod parses input file and searches each line for the 
CADF event identifier. Once it locates it, it isolates it from 
where it was found, up to the point where the number of 
“{“ and “}” symbols are equal. In this way, only CADF data 
are stored in a list. Then, CADF events are stored in a NoSQL 
database (see Fig. 5). In particular, a “document store” type 
of database manager is selected to ideally handle JSON 
documents. The open-source version of the MongoDB 
Community Server is used as the database manager. From 
this point onwards, an investigator is able to, with a 
MongoDB client or by source code, prepare and execute 
queries over stored CADF events. 
 
Fig. 5. Clod is processing two datasets. The file 
raw_cadf_sample is OpenStack’s output, and cs_events is 
CloudStack’s testing phase output 
 
 
10 https://github.com/ndalezios/clod  
9 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has proposed the CADF event model 
implementation for the Apache CloudStack project as the 
main logging format. CADF is a simple yet clear, 
expandable and robust model focused on the events and 
not the underlying technology of the cloud infrastructure. 
OpenStack, at its current version, is using CADF – 
OpenStack was CADF’s targeted platform. Even OpenStack, 
though, does not fully implement CADF. This paper’s 
implementation for CloudStack is not utilizing CADF’s full 
capabilities. The reason for this is that in order for an event 
model to collect as much information possible, it needs to 
touch every single event that occurs on the platform. It has 
to be part of the initial design of the platform. It cannot be 
added later on as an enhancement, because it can cause 
major changes and side-effects to the entire project. Any 
platform or project that can be exploited, or attacked, or 
used by any manner by cybercriminals should take into 
consideration while being designed, to be as much 
forensically friendly as possible. The engineering team and 
the security team must work together and not only test a 
project for vulnerabilities, but also make sure that in case 
of an event, all the necessary information is collected, 
under a standard as CADF. 
10 FUTURE WORK 
In future work, a set of cyber-crime scenarios on 
CloudStack should be executed and then perform forensic 
analysis by using just the information stored in the CADF 
logs. This will bring to the surface all the data that should 
be included in the event logging.  
Forensics investigators, police officers, Law Enforcement 
Agencies and even judicial officers should examine if CADF 
and data extracted from CADF, can solve a digital crime 
case. Are CADF data enough to solve a case? At the same 
time, it should be examined if CADF data could be accepted 
by the judicial authorities. 
Additionally, after having an implementation for 
OpenStack and CloudStack, one should port or develop 
CADF to OpenNebula, the third in ranking open source IaaS 
cloud platform. 
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